mitigate the sense, common to all four groups, that they are invisible citizens. Onstage, Smith represents the activity of speaking together as she presents between twenty and fifty characters at any given performance, modulating her speech pattern and mannerisms, and donning or discarding accessories, to signal a change of character. The characters speak monologues that consist of unedited segments of interviews that Smith conducted to deepen her understanding of the events and their contexts or, in one case in each play, excerpts from public addresses. Residents of Crown Heights and Los Angeles offer first-person narratives and reflections, while politicians, activists, civic figures, and academics limn the histories that made flashpoints of the accident in Brooklyn and acquittal in Simi Valley. These testimonies "incite [audiences'] empathy," as Gregory Jay observes, as they attempt to comprehend the griefs and grievances that characters articulate. 5 However, the necessity of choosing among conflicting accounts of events and ideas of justice as one moves beyond witness to politics in turn exposes the limitations of empathy and the need for reflective judgment. It also, we shall see, discloses the centrality of sacrifice to a healthy democratic praxis. 6 In Crown Heights, competition between blacks and Jews for housing, services, public space, and political recognition escalated as the insular, ultra-orthodox Lubavitchers moved into the predominantly black neighborhood in the 1970s. Audiences learn that even matters like the right to, and the right uses of, streets and sidewalks became highly contentious. Resentment is palpable in Fires in the Mirror as Reverend Canon Doctor Heron Sam objects that the Grand Rebbe has "gotta be whisked! Quickly through the neighborhood" with a police escort for security; even when the Rebbe walks, the "BIG BAND" of people that accompanies him obstructs traffic. 7 A subsequent character, Rabbi Shea Hecht, shrugs off the implication of favoritism. Ignoring the question of how fast the Rebbe's car travels, he contends that any "synagogue, temple, mosque in the world stops traffic when five thousand people have to walk out at the same time" (F, 112). Such charges and countercharges score a contest over who is more disfranchised by a municipal administration that is frequently invoked but never presented. Several Jewish characters suggest that the city's African-American Mayor, David Dinkins, and Police Commissioner, Lee Brown, systematically ignore Jewish concerns. " [T] he Mayor, had been fed . . . his people got what information he got out of the Black community," Rabbi Joseph Spielman stutters, failing to walk back his implication (F, 72-73) . Meanwhile, Anonymous Young Man #1, a black Brooklynite, sees influences from farther afield. "What color is the Israeli flag? And what color are the police cars?" he asks; both feature blue designs on white backgrounds (F, 83). Characters contest even basic details of the fatal accident: Did the car that killed Gavin Cato hit another car, or did another car strike it before it hit Gavin? Did anyone in the Rebbe's motorcade try to lift the car off Gavin? In what order did the city's and Hatzalah's ambulances arrive? Who decided which ambulance would transport which of the injured people and why?
Black-Korean relations in South Central Los Angeles were equally frayed but differently defined. At a time when African-American economic mobility in the region had fallen below the rates of Asian mobility and even second-and third-generation Chicano mobility, black residents perceived the predominantly immigrant shopkeepers, who live elsewhere, to be entering the middle class with profits extracted from the neighborhood. 8 Everyday exchanges amplified, rather than mitigated, the tension. Divergent interpretations of gestures like small talk and eye contact, which Koreans tend to avoid as a sign of respect and African Americans tend to seek for the same reason, led customers and cashiers to regard each others' courtesies as insults. 9 The nadir occurred when convenience store owner Soon Ja Du killed Latasha Harlins in the months between King's beating and the officers' acquittal. 10 "We are not like customer and owner but just like enemy," merchant Jay Woon Yahng explains in Twilight: Los Angeles, soon after Queen Malkah, a Harlins family spokesperson, likens Koreans to "roaches."
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Twilight: Los Angeles frames the conflict differently than does Fires in the Mirror. Whereas the Brooklyn play thematizes identities in competition, characters repeatedly situate the black-Korean conflict in Los Angeles within the structure of Anglo socioeconomic power and its apparatuses, particularly the police, the courts, and the media. "War Zone" is the name of Twilight: Los Angeles's third act, focused on the riot itself, but already in act 1, "The Territory," characters deploy martial rhetoric. Mike Davis describes the police response to gangs and crack cocaine as "a city at war with its own [African American and Latino] children."
12 Cornel West interprets the gangs as resisting and reproducing the "deep machismo ethic" of American settlement, its violence, and its glorification in popular culture (T, 42), while Theresa Allison, founder of Mothers Reclaiming Our Children, asserts that the officers who killed her nephew shot at him "forty-three times . . . to make it look like a drive-by shooting" (T, 33). Former Police Commission president Stanley Scheinbaum confirms the martial mindset when he recalls that after accompanying Congresswoman Maxine Waters to a gang-truce meeting, cops accused him of talking with "our enemy" (T, 14). In a monologue drawn from a speech at First African Methodist Episcopal Church during the riot, Waters observes that the violence stems from conditions documented in the wake of the 1960s urban rebellions but never remediated (see T, 159-60).
The characters' invocations of this history-along with Smith's own use of news-media images as theatrical backdrops, timelines in playbills and published texts, and her reliance on verbatim speech to represent individual viewpoints and dramaturges to ensure just representations of the ethnoracial communities involved-suggest Smith's desire to "confront[] the social dynamics of the moment with some authenticity."
13 She realizes that objective, Charles R. and James C. Lyons argue, not because she is true to the facts but because the plays present "a history of the play of discursive practices in which the events and their reverberations are subjected to diverse configurations and reconfigurations" by characters whose speeches reflect their positioning by "socio-economic dynamics." 14 Viewing Twilight: Los Angeles from a perspective more Marxist than Foucauldian, and measuring it against 1930s documentary theater, Julian Murphet finds the play "strangely lacking in political insight" because it fails to provide authoritative comment either in Smith's own voice or through characters who speak for "privileged social agenc [ies] in which the possibility of effecting political change is identified." 15 Murphet is correct insofar as the plays' politics are neither ideological nor didactic, but processual. Their privileged agency is the polis itself, citizens who undertake to construct a common world through words that render worlds of experience and implicitly contest other citizens' accounts.
In these plays, politics is not "the exercise of power or the struggle for power," as Lyons and Lyons and Murphet assume, but what Rancière describes as "the configuration of a specific world, a specific form of experience in which some things appear to be political objects, some questions political issues or argumentations and some agents political subjects." 16 In this conception, politics is fundamentally aesthetic, a mediation not merely of competing "interests or values but . . . of competing worlds" whose disjuncture gives rise to "wrong[s] that cannot be settled but can be processed all the same." 17 Rancière's emphasis on experience and perception justifies Smith's attention to what she calls "the humanness inside the problems" that the plays present, by which she means the ways that American ethnoracial asymmetries distort citizens' perceptions of political and social worth, and how their language registers those distortions (T, xxiv). This focus also highlights, in a way that Lyons and Lyons's focus on discourse does not, the diversity of experiential worlds within what are often regarded as monolithic communities in conflict. 18 Describing these plays as "call[s] to the community," Smith signals her commitment to staging a political space in which diverse citizens pursue common good (T, xxiv). Yet the ideal of community, with its intimate, organic bonds, is the antithesis of the urban social world that Smith imagines, in Talk to Me and elsewhere, as a space of moral and psychological development through daily intercourse with others unlike oneself. In this, she echoes urban sociologists who hypothesize that frequent experiences of difference may produce citizens less tied to particular ways of life, more open to the claims of others, and thus "capable of envisioning, formulating, and supporting more enlightened and more rational . . . collective decisions," as Kian Tajbakhsh phrases the hope. 19 More often, however, contact with difference has proven inward-turning; the unaddressed legacies of racism present barriers that return citizens to the homogeneous spaces that Richard Sennett calls "purified communit[ies]" and Smith names "safe houses of identity." 20 Shaped by this experience, the characters in Fires in the Mirror and Twilight: Los Angeles frequently speak words marked by a "racial melancholy" that Anne Anlin Cheng locates, for whites and minorities alike, in a disconnect between actual life experience and a "lost, neverpossible perfection" that lingers as an ideal of authentic ethnoracial being. 21 If for minorities these psychic wounds result from material injuries and collective memories, white Americans' melancholy stems from viewing the present against a golden age of democratic equality, the memory of which is haunted by its dependence on the subjection of racial others. Christopher J. Lebron 24 Performing others' speech along with their accents, hesitations, verbal stumbles, and physical gestures, Smith presents American character as a moment of verbal "jazz" that outlines the "rhythmic architecture" of more practiced speakers' personas. 25 For others, that character more often emerges in moments of self-exposure, as when one steps beyond the safe house of his or her ideology and received beliefs and "struggle[s] to have words" that shape experience or intuition into meaning. 26 In either case, Smith maintains, these speech acts illustrate how individual identity "lives in the unique way that a person departs from the English language in a perfect state" in order to mark a particular perception of, and relation to, the world (F, xxx).
Smith's onstage presence recalls Whitman's multitudes-containing persona, whose language is woven from the diversity of American lexicons. Early reviewers remarked the comparison, and Smith has affirmed the inspiration of Whitman's desire "to absorb America and have it absorb him." 27 In their array of juxtaposed voices, however, the plays suggest Williams's textual strategy in Paterson, which weaves the transcribed words of fellow citizens, the poet's own correspondence, and texts of local history into a poem that is from one critical vantage point a record of gender, class, and ecological exploitation. Yet neither poet successfully summons the polis. As "the song of a great composite democratic individual" who apprehends the world as "the exterior form of a divine thought that it knows from now on as its own thought," Leaves of Grass celebrates the essential sameness of souls rather than the accidents of experience that produce difference and dissensus. 28 Closer in form to Smith, Paterson preserves the individual grammars and lexicons of characters who are first introduced as the eponymous protagonist's "thoughts." 29 However, the poem's formal topography, its historical scope, and Williams's philosophical investments in pluralism and individualism all frustrate the emergence of the polis around a specific locus of disagreement.
"You can have democracy without consensus, but you have no democracy without dissent," Stathis Gougoris cautions, defining democracy, as does Rancière, to name the activity that challenges the reason, and reveals the unperceived, of the existing order. 30 Ellison used the phrase "antagonistic cooperation" to name that dynamic, which is so central to his own understanding of politics but missing from Whitman's and, too often, Williams's poleis. 31 As he so often did, Ellison turned to jazz for his clarifying metaphor. In the way that jazz musicians muster their musical skills and knowledge in improvisatory flights of "individual assertion within and against the group," he maintained, so (dismissing Arendt's appeal to sensus communis, a faculty of reflective judgment posited by Immanuel Kant through which humans escape subjective valuation by comparing their individual judgments with "the collective reason of humanity") do democratic citizens call on "techniques, ways of life, and values developed within their respective backgrounds" as they engage in political discourse. 32 "[P]laying artfully upon the audience's sense of experience and form," and seeking to "shape its emotions and perceptions to his vision," the citizen-speaker is met by an audience that responds as both "collaborator and judge," assenting and dissenting as moved by the words and the world they represent. 33 Ellison's Invisible Man represents this symbolic violence of politics through its protagonist's struggles with discursive mastery. Yet to the extent that its rich samplings of American discursive traditions are of Ellison's own making, not the words of actual others, the novel remains an extended, virtuosic solo.
Smith is a solo performer, of course, but she is not the author of the words she speaks, only of the effects their juxtaposition creates-a fact that led the Pulitzer Prize jury for drama to disqualify Twilight: Los Angeles from the field. 34 Smith's relation to those author-characters is a matter of some contention. Some critics suspect her of distorting at least some characters' self-presentations in order to influence the audience's judgment of them. Janelle Reinelt, for example, places Smith's performance on a continuum "somewhere between caricature, Brechtian epic gestus, and mimicry" that contains elements of parody. 35 Lyons and Lyons, who also examine Smith's relation to Brecht, demur; they argue that while Smith's "performance of the figure's speech aims to bring its social determinants to the foreground, the performance does not reveal her judgment of that character as Brecht would demand." Whitman's poetry systematically works to eliminate the distance between self and other, to convert antinomies into complements, and through paratactic placements and syntactic parallelisms to fashion its expansive catalogs into integrative and equalizing structures. 39 These rhetorical strategies express his anti-political conception of democracy as an ethic of axiomatic equality. George Kateb, one of the better critics of Whitman's democratic thought, praises just this aspect of the poetry when he lauds Whitman's twice-avowed commitment to judge "not as the judge judges but as the sun falling around a helpless thing." 40 Kateb declares that ethos "the best interpretation of the democratic idea that unequals must be treated equally and [. . . a] constant appeal . . . to us to exercise recognition."
41 While Smith endeavors to show a similar respect to her characters, she disclaims cognitive understanding of the people whom she performs and knowledge of how histories unknown to her shape their perceptions. Rather than try to find herself in a character, an undertaking that she dismisses as based on a mistaken "humanitarian assumption that we are all the same underneath," Smith develops her characters from the outside. 42 Audiotapes and gestures that she recalls, as well as videotapes of a speaker, if any exist, become "the kernel for a system of movement," while affect is conceived through attention to the full figurative power of the person's words, their speech rhythms, and Smith's physical experience of speaking as that person spoke. 43 These mimeses establish a shared somatic and affective experience because the physical activity "make[s] an impression on [her] body and eventually on [her] psyche." 44 That connection is confirmed, she insists, by the fact that a forgotten detail of a character's gestures may "come to [her as . . .] a physical memory" while she rehearses. 45 Murphet insightfully describes this aistheton, or sensuous knowledge, as a "subterranean energy that flickers through the interstices of words, a subliminal poetics of body rhythm and unsubsumed somatic nature." 46 It lies below the horizon of humanism's self-present self and the socially constructed group identities that define the plays' political divides. Recognition alone does not resolve conflicts, however. As the aistheton situates interlocutor and actor within "a shared aesthesis" that makes dialogue possible, recognition permits discursive engagement of contested matters. 47 This shared discursive space is necessary, Danielle S. Allen wisely cautions, because it is only in "the dreamscape of democracy" that "every citizen consents to every policy with glad enthusiasm." 48 Elsewhere, justice requires judges willing to say no as well as yes. Thus Kateb rightly repudiates Whitman's improbable proclamation of 1860-that neither armies, nor lawyers, nor even "an agreement on paper," but only "[a]ffection shall solve every one of the problems of freedom"-as antithetical to "the very individualism of personality that Whitman is [otherwise] trying to promote." 49 The dissensual elements of Fires in the Mirror and Twilight: Los Angeles emphasize the disparate perspectives that differently-situated citizens hold. In addition to these verbal manifestations, dissensus is visually manifest as Smith's physical presence, never obscured by costume, marks her difference from the people whom she performs. This emphasis on dissimilarity reminds viewers that what we call the people is neither one being-one mind, or one will-nor a set of distinct ethnoracial blocs, but a whole comprised of many sometimes discordant yet complexly related parts. A fundamental challenge for a vigorous democratic praxis, then, is for citizens to cultivate the reserves of what Allen calls democratic trust that allow them willingly to subject themselves to collective judgment. Such trust may be "registered cognitively, as when one believes that a particular fellow citizen is unlikely to take advantage of one's vulnerability," Allen explains, or affectively, as "when one feels confidence, or a lack of fear, during a moment of vulnerability before other citizens." 50 While trust is elicited in moments of political contestation by citizens who demonstrate sensitivity to others' perspectives and needs, it is generated and maintained by ongoing habits of sociability.
Smith's ideal of active citizenship highlights the potential attractions of difference in ways that recall the "eroticized impersonality" of Whitman's urban poems. 51 Her ideal of citizenship may not exist in "a queer proximity [to] cruising," as Whitman's does, but life beyond safe houses is erotic in "the wide sense of attraction to the other, the pleasure and excitement of being drawn out of one's secure routine to encounter the novel, strange, and surprising."
52 When Smith muses on how citizens might "be more imaginative so that we can expand the circles of intimacy that we have to include many more people," her answer focuses on the importance of cultivating a persona in order to navigate the public world. 53 Personas offer an "'[i]t's as if I were,'" Smith explains, "an invitation for us to begin to behave 'as if we were' a group."
54 That "as if" neither presumes nor precludes friendship; it is a tool of civility in the sense of the word that designates the duties of citizenship, whose principle virtue, Aristotle told us, consists in friendship without affection. 55 This expressive, even passionate and im-personal, activity is crucial to politics, and the plays highlight the provisional, often fraught, nature of these identifications. If Smith's presence frustrates the assimilative identifications that come easily to Whitman's textual persona, her performance nonetheless affirms her ability imaginatively to inhabit her interviewees' speech and thus affirms that she is representative-or as representative as any one person can be-of a diverse citizenry. 56 The themes and phrases that repeat across monologues are likewise doubleedged; they limn the commonalities of experience, social position, and even religious belief that divide blacks and the Hassidim in Crown Heights, and blacks and Koreans in Los Angeles. The monologues document trauma, injustice, and recognition withheld. They also display the verbal artistry through which people create selves, respond to conditions, and inhabit worlds. Immersing herself in words and gestures, Smith circumvents the "dead end," as Cheng rightly characterizes it, of theorizing the proper "space of distance between self and other" prior to making an "'ethical identification'" with another person. 57 Such reckoning too often leads to either an anodyne humanism or an array of identitarian communities allegiant to the norms and beliefs that define them. If the former foretells a consensus that represents the extinction of politics, the latter's overinvestment in melancholic identities prevents the discursive space of politics from coming to be.
The costs of such overinvestment are central to Fires in the Mirror, as Jay amply demonstrates. The collective traumas of the black and Jewish holocausts and the narratives of history and theological destiny erected on them threaten to place the present conflict beyond the address of politics. Recognizing the other is unfeasible when both parties claim the same, in some sense privileged, historical identity, all the more so when to recognize the other's claim would entail accepting for oneself an identity-imposter, persecutor-that one rejects. So fraught is this environment that, Thulani Davis observes, characters often feel the need to assert their commitment to the very values that "you should be able to assume . . . human beings" share. 58 As performed by Smith, Roslyn Malamud pointedly (and erroneously, Jay notes) identifies Yankel Rosenbaum, the Australian rabbinical student killed during the riot, as the son of Holocaust survivors (see F, 125). 59 Reuven Ostrov accuses Al Sharpton and Sonny Carson of "making pogroms" against the Lubavitch community (F, 132). By representing Jews as innocent victims of an amorphous antisemitism that is "everywhere you go," the Lubavitchers preclude discussion of their share of responsibility for the conflict; calls for accountability are dismissed as more antisemitism (F, 131). Several black voices articulate similar claims on their own behalf. When Carson asserts that although "it appear that I have all the same kinds of abilities of other folks . . . by nighttime it could all change for me," his allusion to nightriders and sundown towns is likewise disproportionate to the present conflict (F, 105). To a Jewish audience locked in mimetic rivalry, his comment might seem to abuse the memory of Kristallnacht, to which the uprising was, indeed, likened by a Lubavitch group calling itself the Crown Heights Emergency Fund. 60 Some characters attempt to smooth over the rift. Letty Cottin Pogrebin proposes that the verbal conflicts demonstrate that Jews recognize black grievances when other groups do not; "only Jews view Blacks seriously as full human beings that you should address" (F, 50-51) because blacks and Jews are "near" (F, 50) and because Jews "are also panicky" (F, 50). Still, in this "old story," as she calls it, in which "you pick a scapegoat," Jews are the chosen people (F, 50). Malamud tries to assure Smith, and then, as a character, audiences, that her black neighbors "want exactly what [she] want[s] out of life" (F, 123). Only a moment before, however, she admitted that she does not even "know," much less "love," her neighbors "because of the difference of food and religion and what have you here" (F, 123). Her words echo Shea Hecht's pronouncement, three monologues earlier, that blacks and the Hasidim are "all children of God," an assurance he offers on the way to asserting that "we are different and we think we should and can be different" (F, 110). Here, different means distant. Even if he were to invite a black neighbor to dinner, dietary laws prevent reciprocity; "it's not just a question of buying certain food," he explains, "it's buying the food, preparing it a certain way. We can't use your dishes, we can't use your oven" (F, 110-11). Such "social segregation of Jews and Gentiles" is not an accidental effect of cultural practices, Henry Goldschmidt explains in his study of the conflicts in Crown Heights; it is "an explicit goal . . . of the laws of kashrus," which comprise "a crucial dimension of the Israelites' holiness"-in fact, "the Hebrew word for 'holy' means, in essence, 'set apart.'" 61 Such distanced proximity and benign indifference to difference as the rabbi invokes might succeed in multiculturalism's dreamscape; in Crown Heights, it unraveled, leaving both parties seeking advantage with a municipal government and local press that neither of them trusts.
The language of scapegoats and victimization hints obliquely at the theological rivalry that for many residents forecloses recognition of the other. Minister Conrad Mohammed directly addresses that contested claim. Allowing that the Shoah, too, is a "horrible crime" that "stinks in the nostrils of God," he nonetheless asserts that on the scales of death, duration, and depravity, "[n]o crime in the history of humanity has before or since equaled" whites' enslavement of African peoples and the Middle Passage (F, 54). The modes of torture that he recounts make the inhumanity vivid. Yet the worst treachery, he declares, was the theft of blacks' authentic identity. "You can go into Bangladesh today," the minister insists, because they know who they are and where they came from (F, 55). That identity has not disappeared from the earth, however. Articulating a belief also held by many of Crown Heights' Rastafarians, Black Hebrew Israelites, and Afrocentric Christians, Mohammed accuses Jews of stealing African peoples' rightful identity as the people whom "the almighty God Allah has selected as his chosen" (F, 58). Jews are "masquerading in our garment," he insists, by manipulating "seven verses, I believe it is in Deuteronomy," that foretell Israel's dispersal if it disregards God's laws (F, 58).
Nothing else in these plays puts in such dramatic relief the divergence of politics, directed "towards an end to be accomplished," from ethics' orientation "towards the catastrophe behind us," the perspective of Walter Benjamin's powerless angel of history. 63 While Jay obviously is correct that these traumas have "never been subjected to a healing justice"-indeed, some characters experience these holocausts as events still unfolding-it is a mistake to think that justice heals trauma. 64 Jay's phrase conflates the domain of politics, rooted in materiality and grievance, with ethics, which accommodates griefs and traumas for which, as Cheng notes, "[t]here may never be enough expressions of . . . justice, reparation, guilt, pain, or anger." 65 Nor does Jay consider what it would mean to work through a trauma that founds a collective identity, to move beyond what one is enjoined never to forget. As we witness these griefs overshadowing the present, we may recognize that Fires in the Mirror illustrates Paul Gilroy's caution that identities "defined exclusively by . . . histories of ineffable suffering" forsake the agency found in the "ongoing process of self-making and social interaction" on which politics depends. 66 Signaling a way beyond the impasse of Fires in the Mirror, whose title invokes holocausts and rivalries, Twilight: Los Angeles, whose title's first word suggests transition and ambivalence, opens with a prologue that distills the tensions of the divided polis into the struggle of a single character. "My Enemy" offers the words of Rudy Salas, Sr., a visual artist who bears physical scars from a police beating during the Zoot Suit Riots and psychological scars from "nice white teachers" who told him he "was inferior because [he] was a Mexican" (T, 2). As his monologue continues, his enemy expands to encompass the racism that he harbors, a tragic knowledge that he seeks to disclaim by naming it in the language of pathology: "[A] hate in me" (T, 3), "this madness," "the insanity" (T, 2). It manifests, Murphet notes, in the "irrepressible tapping and sweeping" of Salas's hands and other involuntary gestures that betray an "'insanity' of the body." 67 He portrays himself an unwilling host-or hostage-to feelings that lead him to delight in whites' evident fear of cholos, Chicano gang members, on the street and in the malls. Turning on that image of the cholos, he confesses a desire "to kill their dads . . . break into their houses and drag their dads out," perhaps as retribution for, or a warning against, what those sons have, or will, become: "Well, you see," he says, "that relieves me" (T, 5). The monologue ends with anger subsiding into lament as Salas relates a traffic stop involving his son Stephen, then in school at Stanford. He pleads, "How you think a father feels, stuff that happened to me fifty years ago happened to my son?" (T, 6). The grief is palpable. Yet unlike characters in Fires in the Mirror, who employ the rhetoric of trauma and the innocence it bestows to disclaim responsibility for the conflict, Salas's lament is reflective; his words evince his struggle with his own participation in the racial logic that he decries.
The five acts that follow describe temporal and conceptual arcs that move from the baseline of police and gang violence in "The Territory" through "Here's a Nobody" and "War Zone," which concern the first trial and the riot. Act 4, "Twilight," includes a disparate set of characters who reflect on the riot's potential as a transitional moment. As voices of the liberal establishment, Senator Bill Bradley delivers a homily on individual responsibility, while Otis Chandler, the patrician former publisher of the Los Angeles Times, floats proposals for new, regressive taxes to fund social programs. Chandler thus inadvertently embodies director Peter Sellars's act-opening personification of the ascendant voice of American politics as James Tyrone (the paterfamilias of Eugene O'Neill's Long Day's Journey into Night [1956] ) "rant[ing] on and on about everything he's ever done for you. How he's lived all his life just to support his family. But he won't change the light bulbs," at least not without billing the family (T, 199). Homi Bhabha views the "inclarity" and "enigma" of the "L. A. uprisings" through the metaphor of twilight as a moment of "ambivalence and ambiguity" (T, 232) in which "we have to interpret more . . . make ourselves part of the act" (T, 233). One becomes part of the act through its staging both by being moved by words to find one's relation with the characters and because any interpretation involves giving the act a certain configuration. Each of them is an aesthetic activity, an act of world making. They are also political in that they undertake "to introduce . . . new subjects and objects, to render visible what had not been, and to make heard as speakers those who had been perceived as mere noisy animals," which is how much of the mainstream press portrayed the rioters. 68 The final act, "Justice," most directly poses the question before the polis. It opens with Smith as Harland W. Braun, defense council for Theodore Briseno, the officer who testified against two of his codefendants and was acquitted in both trials. 69 Braun asks, "Is it better that two innocent people get convicted than that fifty innocent people die?" (T, 241). Against the backdrop of the riot and the justice system's pervasive racism, he finds the answer "ambigu[ous]" (T, 241). His uncertainty is not evasive. It recognizes that for many observers the case involved more than what four men did and failed to do. It once more exposed racial disparities in policing and political disregard for impoverished neighborhoods; it raised questions about the focus and effectiveness of the Los Angeles Police Department's training methods, and it intersected the simmering conflict between Koreans and African Americans. Without disputing Officers Koon's and Powell's guilt, he asks if the truth of the second trial was the finding of guilt or "the truth of the society that has to find them guilty in order to protect itself" (T, 243).
Mrs. Young-Soon Han follows Braun, offering an impassioned and sophisticated reflection on justice that engages earlier monologues by Paul Parker and an unnamed Hollywood agent. Parker, who appears in act 3, is the chair of a defense committee for four black men accused of severely beating Reginald Denny, a white trucker, soon after the police were acquitted. He is also, he tells us, a son whose father's murderer was allowed to plead out because "if it's a nigger killin' a nigger, they don't have no problem with that" (T, 171). Parker sees that same devaluation of black and brown lives in the elevation of "this one white boy" (T, 173) as the riot's symbolic victim; "many people got beat, but you didn't hear about the Lopezes or the Vaccas or the, uh, Quintanas or the, uh, Tarvins," he observes (T, 172). In a passage that rhymes with, and inverts, Denny's own second-act vow to create "a happy room" filled with "all the, the love and compassion and the funny notes and the letters from faraway places" that he received while On the content of that justice, Parker vacillates. Momentarily, he dons the mantle of victim to instruct an imagined white critic: "[W]e innocent . . . you kidnapped us, you raped our women" (T, 173), but he repositions himself as an avenger of history when he explains that the uprising was not about King or even Harlins, but "for Kunta . . . for Kizzy . . . for Chicken George" (T, 176). It is soon apparent that the justice he desires will not be arrived at but will be claimed, by force if necessary. "[W]e got some weapons, we got our pride," he boasts, his rhetoric recalling West's words on American violence's roots in a conviction of righteousness and a sense of destiny and duty (T, 176). As Parker portrays looting and arson as speaking and acting "in a way that was just" (T, 176), and as he threatens violence to a generic white "you . . . [or] your daughter . . . somewhere in your family" (T, 178), we see the ethical disadvantage that grows from his knowledge that he is not an equal democratic self. His blackness melancholic, his ethos formed by a justified belief that South Central Los Angeles and similarly situated communities are excluded from the social contract, Parker understands himself not to be a citizen in any politically meaningful sense.
The Hollywood agent contemplates his own share in any calculation of justice. He agrees with Parker and others that blacks and Latinos are "victims of the system," which "plays unequally" to whites' advantage and others' disadvantage (T, 140). The effacement of human agency from his phrasing suggests his own struggle with responsibility. He would prefer to think the outcomes happen "not intentionally" but through what Lebron would call the "bad character" of institutions whose frameworks and protocols perpetuate racial biases that individual actors may neither share nor consciously register (T, 141). 70 The agent believes that he empathizes with black rage and despair, although his invocation of the spectacle of "people reduced to burning down their own neighborhoods" as the riot's most affecting image clashes with residents' own accounts of what happened (T, 141). He fails to see that South Central is not theirs if they own neither the property nor the wealth produced there; Parker exults, "we burned down these Koreans in this neighborhood" (T, 175).
With his own implication in the socioeconomic conditions that underlie the violence and his own obligation in a reckoning of justice, the agent struggles. He concedes that because of how "the system plays," whites "generically" may well "deserve" the violence (T, 139); "burning down our own neighborhoods" would have been a reasonable response to systematic injustice, he admits (T, 141). But does his own house deserve to be burned? To that question, his answer is ambiguous. While he reports that he "started to absorb a little guilt" as he contemplated the situation, he no doubt believes that he earned his successes (T, 140). This gap between personal and generic responsibility in his accounting registers the difference between two prevailing modes of framing a political identity and, thus, of calculating responsibility toward others. Liberal individualism casts him as a free agent who enjoys what his labor returns to him in the market's private sphere. The generic calculation places him within a constituency that benefits from an unfair distribution of economic, political, and social goods and power. These two calculations imply three modes of personal identity: individual identity that sets store by autonomy and personal integrity, and two group identities, a normative whiteness that becomes uncomfortable as it takes its place among the other constituencies comprising the demos, which itself constitutes the third horizon of identity. How might the agent calculate his moral obligation as an advantaged member of a polis that distributes rewards and burdens unfairly, and, perhaps, for his own complicity through unexamined assumptions that perpetuate his racial advantage? Skirting that critical question, the Agent recalls those "heartbreaking" scenes of conflagration, exuding a politically inert sympathy (T, 141).
Mrs. Han, a merchant whose uninsured convenience store provided one of those scenes, believes that she empathizes with the anger and grief of black Angelenos. She says she is happy that they achieved some justice in the federal civil-rights trial, which convicted Koon and Powell. Still, her words circle loss and the thought that the retrial and conviction were at least partially a response to the violence that "destroy[ed] innocent Korean merchants," two-thirds of them uninsured (T, 247). "Where do I finda [sic] justice?" she asks (T, 246). Her question echoes Parker's, while her claim of Koreans' innocence and black culpability inverts his own argument that Korean merchants were stealing wealth from the community, "like the Jews in the day" (T, 175). 71 Unexpectedly, she turns to African-American history and speculates that Koreans may need to endure more losses before their voice will register in the collective imagining of justice: Invoking the "mainstream," Mrs. Han begins to put a face on the agent's "system." She is correct that Koreans became the riot's convenient scapegoat at least in part because they lacked a political presence to advance their grievances; confronting that fate, they debated amongst themselves, "'Who victimized us?', and 'how do we politically empower ourselves?'"
72
Invoking African Americans' sacrifices, Mrs. Han unknowingly invokes a crucial feature of Ellison's democratic theory, which Allen further develops in Talking to Strangers. Sacrifice is the centerpiece of Ellison's response to Arendt's notorious critique of school desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas. She "has absolutely no conception of what goes on in the minds of Negro parents when they send their children through those lines of hostile people," Ellison objected to Robert Penn Warren after Arendt had chided the parents and the NAACP for, as she saw it, placing the burden of desegregation on high-school students. 73 Exposing blind spots in Arendt's sensus communis, Ellison highlighted "the basic, implicit heroism of people who must live within a society without recognition, real status," but who, nevertheless, are intimately "involved in the ideals of that society and . . . trying to determine their true position and their rightful position within it."
74 Central to that undertaking, he insisted, is a transformation of the "old traditional role of national scapegoat" into an "ideal of sacrifice."
75 Subjecting themselves to "a rite of initiation . . . [into] the terrors of social life with all the mysteries stripped away," the Little Rock Nine chose to risk psychological and bodily harm at the hands of their white fellow citizens as part of a strategy "to bring America's conduct into line with its professed ideals." 76 While we may wonder how fully Mrs. Han can empathize with African Americans' resentment of Korean merchants in their midst given her insistence on Koreans' innocence, her political insight does not directly involve empathy. Its focus is the role of sacrifice in a democratic polis. Korean merchants were sacrificed, Mrs. Han understands, to the extent that the riot reset the racial détente by releasing black anger and ensuring a second trial of the officers. Yet much as the Invisible Man recognizes in the eponymous novel's epilogue that although he and generations of African Americans had been sacrificed for an illusion of equality that extended only to whites and was premised on blacks' enslavement, political activity may convert that suffering into a claim on that same aspiration toward democratic equality. Mrs. Han, too, recasts passively suffered loss as active sacrifice. In this way, she writes Koreans and Korean Americans into the political script as actors rather than-to be blunt-as props.
Sacrifice is more than a strategy of the disfranchised, however. Allen deems it "a democratic fact" confronted anew each time that competing claims or interests cannot be fully honored. 77 The necessity of sacrifice returns us to the importance of sociability for cultivating trust by converting the distances of divergent experiences and perspectives into spaces of discourse guided by a shared investment in certain basic-if also contested-values. It thus highlights the political utility of the aesthetic as a space in which one tries on other experiences and perspectives. Martha Nussbaum offers a version of this argument in Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life, but its limitations become evident as one works through these plays. Nussbaum focuses on the value, for citizens, of the sympathetic bonds that readers of realist novels develop with particular characters by imagining the conditions of their lives. Yet as we saw with Twilight: Los Angeles's Hollywood agent, sympathy alone is an insufficient (if pedagogically popular) response to injustice because the aesthetic imagination that allows identification needs as its complement an act of reflective judgment that, like aesthetic judgment, divines its rule in the particular. If the agent's expression of solidarity evades the messier problem of conceiving what justice might require, so too do readers of Nussbaum's touchstone, Charles Dickens's Hard Times (1854), who sympathize with Sissy Jupe's and Stephen Blackpool's plights and, like the narrator, lose sight of the underlying questions of economic justice. 78 Moreover, many of Smith's characters prompt a question seemingly unthinkable in Poetic Justice: what justice do we owe to characters whose beliefs or manner makes them unsympathetic? Jill Dolan is certainly correct that Smith is "not trying to get her audiences to love [her characters]," only "willing to hear their lives and perspectives juxtaposed against each other."
79 But that reception is by no means assured. No diegetic narrator frames the monologues, only titles that do not prefigure their arguments. Audiences have no somatic bonds with characters, only the visual evidence of Smith's ability to slide in and out of characters as an invitation to attempt to inhabit the words they hear. Yet that invitation unfolds against a backdrop of still photographs and video that keeps the events' violence vividly before viewers' eyes, while characters not infrequently utter blatantly racist or sexist comments that weaken the impulse toward identification.
Even smaller details, like Scheinbaum referring to the gang-truce leaders as "these curious people about whom I know nothing" (T, 14), or Theresa Allison referring to her son by his street name, "Sniper" (T, 37), offer viewers reasons to cease listening to particular characters. One critic dismisses Salas as "a gringo-hating Latino ranting against the 'peckerwoods.'" 80 Others object to Mrs. Han for embodying a "dangerously flat or cartoonish 'Korean-ness,'" and Mrs. Walter Park, whose husband suffered brain damage from a bullet, for being "too stereotypically submissive and devoted."
81 Sandra Kumamoto Stanley reports that her students feared that Mrs. Han may "offend[] Asian immigrants who often feel marginalized precisely because of their speech," but she is silent about their reaction, if any, to her political insight. 82 When her dramaturge Dorinne Kondo objected to a "'selfAfricanizing' statement" made by King's aunt, Smith justly responded, "in the academy, you all tend to take more control over what could be said. And I have very mixed feelings about that." 83 Her comment is on point because it suggests that rather than offering recognition to others and treating them with dignity, many audiences and critics want representations of ourselves to be better than we are, and are too ready to take offense and thus to discount wisdom from imperfect vessels.
Audiences' knowledge of the events makes the exercise of critical empathy more challenging, even as it may suit Smith's desire for performances to function as "civic event Unsettling as these scenes may be, Smith finds hope in them as she insists that these audience members, like the Jewish woman who audibly moaned "Oy" in response to several monologues at a different performance, are acting as citizens, "talking as much to each other as to [her]" (F, xxxviii). Indeed, they are. Yet their comments lack the mutuality that distinguishes talking to others from the political activity of talking with others. These voices mirror the divide presented on stage. The plays achieve their potential, Smith strongly implies, only when the words of a character, the reactions of others in the audience, or the post-play discussions that often accompanied the performance move viewers out of their safe houses to imagine the world from another perspective.
After the U. S. director of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front explains that what happened in Los Angeles lacked the planning and coordination to be considered an uprising, Twilight: Los Angeles's final monologue comes obliquely to the roles of sociability, mutuality, and imagination in engendering a public sphere. It thereby provides a stark contrast to the close of Fires in the Mirror, in which the grieving, defiant father, Carmel Cato, asserts that "the Jewish people" are "runnin' the whole show from the judge right down" (F, 138), but "[t]here's no way they can overpower [him]" because he is "one of the special" (F, 139). Here, the eponymous Twilight Bey tells of his dawning awareness of his responsibility for the condition of the world around him. A twenty-something leader of the gang-truce movement, Bey recalls nighttime walks and talks among the homeless people, crack addicts, and the kids who beat them for kicks that provided him "a total dose of what [the activity that] goes on in the daytime creates at night" (T, 256). Riffing on his name, he positions himself at a junction: I see darkness as myself. I see the light as knowledge and the wisdom of the world and understanding others, and in order for me to be a, to be a true human being, I can't forever dwell in darkness, I can't forever dwell in the idea, of just identifying with people like me and understanding me and mine.
(T, 255)
In these words that serve as benediction as much as epilogue, Bey does not speak for everyone. He speaks about speaking and listening as a practice capable of taking responsibility for the world that becomes common when citizens agree to act sociably. Describing earlier in the play his journey to South Central to participate in the cleanup after the riot, Reverend Tom Choi also addresses the ethical and political importance of making oneself vulnerable to others. He speaks disarmingly of the anxiety that such exposure triggers. Choi confesses that he hid behind the clerical collar he had not worn "for about seven or eight years" so that no one would "mistake [him] for a Korean shop owner" until he found his presence and offers of small talk warmly welcomed (T, 201). His unease is one of many allusions to what Smith has called "the war . . . between us . . . that has never been fully fought" over racism and its legacies. 86 This war still lacks a language in which to be fought, she notes; indeed, language itself will be a primary terrain of struggle. Smith's performance embodies what this sort of democratic discourse entails as she confers dignity on her interlocutors, places them on equal footing, recognizes their speech as poiesis-attempts at self-and world-making-and seeks in those words and acts of speaking a sense of how the world must appear to other people. It asks audience members to evaluate what they hear and see and how they react in light of their own avowed democratic beliefs. It further challenges them, as members of a polis, to stage for themselves ways of being with others that address the gaps between their own avowed beliefs and actual practices. In this way, the plays suggest that a more just polis will emerge-if it does-and cities will flourish as places of attraction, engagement, and growth-if they dothrough improvised accommodations among formerly indifferent, if not outwardly hostile people who discover that they need to rely on each other or benefit from doing so.
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1 Jacques Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, trans. Liz Heron (London: Verso, 2007), 51. 2 Anna Deavere Smith, Talk to Me: Travels in Media and Politics (New York: Anchor, 2001), 11. That "we" is a "potential America" (10) broadened from the narrow compass of propertied "white men who were the original 'we' in 'we the people'" (10) but placed at risk, Smith fears, by conflicts over "who could speak for whom" (11).
3 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958), 198. The history of the term citizen is complex. In ancient Athens, it denoted those members of a polis deemed capable of governing and being governed. In the Middle Ages, it named inhabitants of a city who participated in its life and enjoyed certain rights and protections not available to denizens who, like Athenian metics, were noncitizen residents. This usage has reemerged in discussions of urban migrant, diasporic, and refugee populations-often but by no means exclusively in so-called world cities-who combine a local sense of belonging with transnational identifications. 10 Soon Ja Du and Latasha Harlins fought in the store, and Du shot Harlins as she was leaving. Du received probation, a fine, and community service because the judge found that she acted in fear, would not be a threat to the community, and that the gun had been altered in ways that made it more susceptible to accidental discharge (see 
